

The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE**

SEAN WILSON, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PLAYTIKA, LTD., an Israeli limited company,
and CAESARS INTERACTIVE
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC., a Delaware limited
liability company.

Defendants.

No. 18-cv-05277-RSL

**PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT**

Noting Date: January 15, 2021

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INTRODUCTION

1
2 In 2018, on the heels of Class Counsel’s appellate victory in *Kater*, Sean Wilson initiated
3 this lawsuit alleging that Defendants’ social casinos are illegal gambling under Washington law.
4 Since that time, Plaintiff and his counsel have vigorously litigated this case before this Court, the
5 Ninth Circuit, the Washington State Gambling Commission, and even the Washington
6 Legislature. After substantial mediation efforts assisted by Phillips ADR, Plaintiff and
7 Defendants reached a class settlement, that creates, among other obligations, Defendants to
8 establish a non-reversionary \$38 million common fund. The fund is sufficient to compensate
9 every class member who has ever lost money playing Defendants’ social casino games is entitled
10 to a recovery and those with higher levels of losses are entitled to recover increasingly higher
11 percentages of their losses.

12 Utilizing data from Defendants and Platform Providers—entities through which Class
13 Members purchased chips to gamble at Defendants’ social casinos—the Court-approved Notice
14 Plan has been successfully implemented. The reaction of the class to date has been exceptional:
15 thousands of Class Members have already submitted claims and the claims deadline is still
16 several weeks out. By contrast, no class members have requested exclusion or objected to the
17 settlement. Given the life-changing relief afforded, this volume of claims is not surprising and is
18 consistent with the projections made at preliminary approval. Participating Class Members stand
19 to recover substantial portions of their losses, with those who have lost the most standing to
20 recover more than half of their gambling losses. By way of example, Class Members with
21 Lifetime Spend Amounts of \$10,000 stand likely to recover \$2,200-\$5,900 and Class Members
22 with Lifetime Spend Amounts of \$100,000 stand likely to recover more than \$50,000. Equally as
23 important, the settlement requires Playtika to provide addiction-related resources within its social
24 casino games and to create and honor a self-exclusion policy like those at Washington brick-and-
25 mortar casinos.

26 Given the novelty of Plaintiff’s claim, Professor William B. Rubenstein (author of the
27 influential treatise *Newberg on Class Actions*) describes the recovery as an “astounding

1 accomplishment” and calls the relief provided “historic.” And although there are no truly
 2 comparable settlements, the closest factual analogue pales in comparison to the relief afforded
 3 here. *See In re Apple In-App Purchase Litig.*, 5:11-CV-01758 EJD, 2013 WL 1856713.at *1
 4 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (providing \$5 to users of apps that “compel children playing them to
 5 purchase large quantities” of in-game currency, “amounting to as much as \$100 *per purchase* or
 6 more”) (emphasis added). So, too, do typical consumer privacy class settlements, which often
 7 provide *cy pres* relief with no individual payments. *See In re Google Referrer Header Privacy*
 8 *Litig.*, 869 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2017), *vacated on other grounds by Frank v. Gaos*, 139 S. Ct.
 9 1041 (2019).

10 For the reasons that follow, this settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate the Court
 11 should not hesitate to grant final approval.

12 BACKGROUND

13 For the Court’s convenience, the following “Background” section is included both in this
 14 motion and in the contemporaneously-filed motion for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and incentive
 15 awards:

16 In 2014, Class Counsel began investigating the burgeoning social casino industry. *See*
 17 Declaration of Todd Logan (“Logan Decl.”) ¶ 3. The results of that investigation were startling:
 18 multinational gambling corporations like Caesars Entertainment, Churchill Downs, International
 19 Game Technology, and Scientific Games had found a way to smuggle slot machines onto
 20 consumers’ smart phones without complying with any federal or state gambling laws. *Id.* ¶ 4. By
 21 2015, social casino games were capturing more than \$3 billion in annual revenues.¹ Those
 22 revenues, just like those of Vegas casinos, were disproportionately derived from gambling
 23 addicts who just couldn’t stop themselves from buying chips and spinning the slots. Moreover,
 24 those revenues—at least in Class Counsel’s judgment—were entirely ill-gotten gains under a
 25 variety of state gambling laws. *See* Logan Decl. ¶ 4.

26
 27 ¹ *See* Dean Takahashi, *13 predictions for the future of the \$3.4B social casino games market*, GAMESBEAT
 (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:00 AM), <https://bit.ly/37TPao9>.

1 Based on that investigation, in 2015 Class Counsel initiated a nationwide, multi-forum
 2 campaign against the social casino industry. *See id.* ¶ 5. As Professor William B. Rubenstein, the
 3 sole author of *Newberg on Class Actions*, summarizes that campaign (and its results):

4 Prior to entering academia, I was a lawyer at the national office of the
 5 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for nearly a decade, during which
 6 time I pursued civil rights campaigns on behalf of minority groups. Based
 7 on that experience, it strikes me that what Class Counsel have pursued here
 8 is closer in form to a civil rights litigation campaign than it is to a series of
 9 discrete class action settlements. Class Counsel saw an injustice – a thinly
 10 disguised form of gambling preying on those most vulnerable to addictive
 11 gambling – and they sought to fix it. Their goal was not to win a case but
 12 to reform an entire industry, much like a civil rights campaign might aim to
 13 reform a particular type of discriminatory practice across an entire
 14 employment sector. To accomplish this end, Class Counsel went far beyond
 15 what lawyers pursuing a simple class action case would normally do. Class
 16 Counsel pursued multiple cases. Class Counsel pursued multiple
 17 defendants. Class Counsel filed actions in multiple forums. Class Counsel
 18 tested various state laws. Class Counsel built websites to help app users
 19 avoid forced arbitration clauses, lobbied legislators and regulators, and took
 20 their efforts to the media. When Class Counsel lost, they did not give up,
 21 but changed tactics or forums and kept going. And they did all of this with
 22 their own funds, risking millions of dollars of their own money to end this
 23 practice. What they have achieved so far, with these initial settlements, is
 24 an astounding accomplishment that begins to chip away at the pernicious
 25 underlying social casinos.

16 Declaration of Professor William B. Rubenstein (“Rubenstein Decl.”) ¶ 2.

17 Because the extraordinary settlement here is but a part of Class Counsel’s efforts carrying
 18 the banner nationwide for victims of the social casino industry, a summary of Class Counsel’s
 19 efforts both before this Court and otherwise is provided below.

20 **I. Class Counsel’s 2015 Social Casino Lawsuits.**

21 Having concluded that social casinos—including Caesars’ and Playtika’s “Caesars Slots”
 22 and “Slotomania”—constituted gambling, between April and October of 2015, Class Counsel
 23 filed (5) proposed class action lawsuits (including one against Caesars and Playtika), in four (4)
 24 different courts, alleging class claims under five (5) different sets of state gambling laws. *See* (1)
 25 *Dupee v. Playtika Santa Monica, et al.* No. 15-cv01021 (N.D. Ohio May 21, 2015) (alleging
 26 claims under Ohio and Nevada gambling laws); (2) *Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc.*, No. 15-cv-
 27 00612 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2015) (alleging claims under Washington gambling law); (3)

1 *Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc.*, No. 15-cv-01107 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2015) (alleging claims under
 2 California and Illinois gambling laws) (4) *Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC*, No. 15-cv-
 3 04301 (N.D. Ill.) (removed May 14, 2015) (alleging claims under Illinois gambling laws); and
 4 (5) *Ristic v. Mach. Zone, Inc.* No. 15-cv-08996 (N.D. Ill.) (Oct. 9, 2015) (alleging claims under
 5 Illinois gambling laws).

6 Each federal district court initially presented with Class Counsel’s theory of these
 7 cases—*i.e.*, that social casinos are illegal gambling and consequently must return to consumers
 8 their ill-gotten gains—squarely rejected it. *See Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc.*, 851 F.3d 315, 316
 9 (4th Cir. 2017); *Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc.*, No. C15-612 MJP, 2015 WL 9839755, at *3
 10 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2015), *rev’d*, 886 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2018); *Dupee v. Playtika Santa*
 11 *Monica*, No. 15-cv-01021, 2016 WL 795857, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2016); *Phillips v. Double*
 12 *Down Interactive LLC*, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 739 (N.D. Ill. 2016); *Ristic v. Mach. Zone, Inc.*, No.
 13 15-CV-8996, 2016 WL 4987943, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2016). In representative fashion,
 14 Judge Pechman’s dismissal order in *Kater* concluded that “Big Fish Casino does not award
 15 something of value satisfying the requisite prize element, and therefore the game is not ‘illegal
 16 gambling’ under Washington law.” *Kater*, 2015 WL 9839755, at *3.

17 **II. Class Counsel Appeals The *Kater* Dismissal And The Ninth Circuit Reverses.**

18 Following Judge Pechman’s dismissal order in *Kater*, Class Counsel appealed. Merits
 19 briefing before the Ninth Circuit concluded in September 2016, and oral argument was held in
 20 February 2018. In March 2018, the Ninth Circuit reversed:

21 In this appeal, we consider whether the virtual game platform “Big Fish
 22 Casino” constitutes illegal gambling under Washington law. Defendant–
 23 Appellee Churchill Downs, the game’s owner and operator, has made
 24 millions of dollars off of Big Fish Casino. However, despite collecting
 25 millions in revenue, Churchill Downs, like Captain Renault in *Casablanca*,
 purports to be shocked—shocked!—to find that Big Fish Casino could
 constitute illegal gambling. We are not. We therefore reverse the district
 court and hold that because Big Fish Casino’s virtual chips are a “thing of
 value,” Big Fish Casino constitutes illegal gambling under Washington law.

26 *Kater*, 886 F.3d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 2018). In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit dispensed with a
 27 variety of the arguments that had persuaded district courts nationwide to initially dismiss the

1 social casino cases. For example, the Court rejected the argument that social casino chips “do not
2 extend gameplay, but only enhance it.” *Id.* at 787. The Circuit also rejected Big Fish’s argument
3 that the Washington State Gambling Commission had determined that social casino games aren’t
4 gambling, concluding that “these documents do not indicate that the Commission adopted a
5 formal position on social gaming platforms.” *Id.* at 788. And the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected
6 the “the reasoning of other federal courts that have held that certain ‘free to play’ games are not
7 illegal gambling.” *Id.*

8 **III. Class Counsel’s Litigation Conduct Before This Court.**

9 Soon after remand in *Kater*, Class Counsel filed this proposed class action lawsuit on
10 behalf of Plaintiff Sean Wilson alleging that, like Big Fish Casino, Defendants’ social casino
11 games—including “Slotomania,” “House of Fun,” “Caesars Slots,” and “Vegas Downtown
12 Slots” (together, the “Applications”)—constitute unlawful gambling under Washington’s
13 gambling laws. *See* Dkt. 1.

14 In July 2018, Playtika moved to dismiss, arguing variously that the Court lacks personal
15 jurisdiction over it, that a forum selection clause required the Court to dismiss the case with
16 prejudice in favor of the dispute being litigated in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Israel (and under Israeli law),
17 and that Wilson’s claim failed because virtual coins in Playtika’s Applications are not “things of
18 value.” *See generally* Dkt. 40. To properly address Playtika’s jurisdictional arguments, the
19 Parties stipulated to, and the Court granted, Plaintiff leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
20 *See* Dkts. 44, 45. With that discovery concluded, Plaintiff filed separate briefs: (1) opposing
21 Playtika’s *forum non conveniens* motion, *see* Dkt. 48; (2) opposing Playtika’s 12(b)(6) motion,
22 *see* Dkt. 52; and (3) opposing Playtika’s personal jurisdiction motion, *see* Dkt. 57.

23 In November 2018, in a twenty-five page published opinion, the Court agreed with
24 Plaintiff, finding that Playtika is in fact subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction because
25 Playtika “used its apps to sell many coins to many users located in Washington,” that Playtika’s
26 forum selection clause arguments failed in part because the State of Washington has a strong
27 interest in “ensuring that its residents are protected against the dangers of” social casino apps,

1 and that Wilson adequately stated a claim because virtual chips in the Applications are a “thing
2 of value” and no relevant exceptions apply. *Wilson v. Playtika, Ltd.*, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (W.D.
3 Wash. 2018) (Dkt. 68). Playtika answered shortly thereafter. *See* Dkt. 74.

4 By prior agreement of the Parties, Caesars had reserved its pleadings motions pending the
5 Court’s resolution of Playtika’s pleadings motions. *See* Dkt. 37. And by additional agreement of
6 the Parties, Wilson and Playtika agreed to an elongated briefing schedule for Caesars’s pleadings
7 motions, intended to allow Wilson adequate time to conduct appropriate jurisdictional discovery.
8 *See* Dkt. 71. In line with those agreements, shortly after the Court’s denial of Playtika’s motions
9 Caesars filed its own motion challenging the Court’s jurisdiction and arguing that Wilson failed
10 to state a claim. *See* Dkt. 75. Over the coming months, the Parties engaged in substantial
11 jurisdictional discovery efforts, including Caesars’s production of thousands of pages of
12 documents. *See* Dkt. 121 ¶ 3.

13 In March 2019, Playtika filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) asking the Court
14 to certify for interlocutory appeal the order denying Playtika’s motion to dismiss, arguing that
15 Plaintiffs’ repeated use of Defendants’ social casino games meant he had consented to
16 Defendants’ forum selection provision. *See* Dkt. 79. Over Plaintiff’s opposition, *see* Dkt. 84, that
17 motion was granted. *See* Dkt. 85. The Ninth Circuit initially stayed Playtika’s petition for
18 permission to appeal pending resolution of appeals in the *Huuuge* and *DoubleDown* cases, where
19 the defendants similarly contended that plaintiffs were bound by arbitration provisions in part
20 because they repeatedly used the defendants’ social casino apps. In March 2020, after plaintiffs
21 in those related cases prevailed in both appeals, the Ninth Circuit denied Playtika’s petition. *See*
22 Dkt. 101.

23 Around the same time, Playtika filed a motion asking the Court to certify a trio of
24 questions to the Washington Supreme Court, essentially asking the Court to circumvent *Kater* by
25 giving the Washington Supreme Court an opportunity to determine that social casino chips are
26 not, in fact, “things of value.” *See* Dkt. 99. Plaintiff opposed that motion, arguing both that it was
27 procedurally improper and Playtika was not entitled to a “second chance at victory” on an issue it

1 already lost. *See* Dkt. 102 at 2 (quoting *All. for Prop. Rights & Fiscal Responsibility v. City of*
2 *Idaho Falls*, 742 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013)). The Court agreed with Plaintiff, denying
3 Playtika’s certification motion in May 2020. *See* Dkt. 113. In May 2020, the Parties agreed to
4 attempt to resolve this case through mediation.

5 On June 10, 2020, the Parties reached an agreement in principle as to an appropriate
6 settlement amount. *See* Dkt. 121 ¶ 9. Negotiations on remaining term sheet issues continued until
7 a final term sheet was executed on June 12, 2020. *See id.* ¶ 10. But the negotiations didn’t end
8 there: for the next several weeks, the Parties worked out the details of a final and binding class
9 action settlement agreement, exchanged several rounds of a working settlement document and
10 supporting exhibits, met and conferred telephonically to flesh out the remaining disputed
11 provisions, and began the process of meeting and conferring with the Platform Providers to
12 design a robust notice and administration plan. *See id.* ¶ 11. On August 5, 2020, the Parties
13 completed execution of the Settlement Agreement now before the Court. *See id.* ¶ 12. Wilson
14 filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of that Agreement on August 23, 2020, *see*
15 Dkt. 120, and the Court granted preliminary approval on August 31, 2020, *see* Dkt. 124.

16 **IV. Class Counsel’s Litigation-Adjacent Efforts On Behalf Of The Class.**

17 As a necessary extension of the traditional litigation work necessitated by these cases,
18 Class Counsel has for years undertaken all manner of litigation-adjacent work for the benefit of
19 the Class. These efforts are organized into three categories and summarized below.

20 *First*, Class Counsel went great lengths to protect this litigation from collateral
21 administrative attacks. Just two weeks after the Ninth Circuit’s mandate issued in *Kater*,
22 Defendants’ industry peers dispatched their litigation attorneys to the Washington State
23 Gambling Commission’s (“WSGC”) session in Tacoma to present a “Petition for a Declaratory
24 Order” asking the Commission to declare that other social casino games “do[] not constitute
25 gambling within the meaning of the Washington Gambling Act, RCW 9.46.0237.” *Kater*, No.
26 15-cv-00612, Dkt. 79-5 at 1. At each of the three public hearings that followed—in July 2018 (in
27 Tacoma), August 2018 (in Pasco), and October 2018 (in Olympia)—Class Counsel appeared

1 before the Commission, and Class Counsel presented live argument at both the Tacoma and
2 Pasco hearings. *See* Logan Decl. ¶ 10. Class Counsel supplemented these appearances with a
3 formal letter to the Commission (ahead of the Tacoma hearing) and, on the Commission’s
4 request, with an eighteen-page comment for the Commission’s consideration (between the
5 Tacoma and Pasco hearings). *Id.* The WSGC ultimately declined to enter a Declaratory Order.
6 *See Kater*, No. 15-cv-00612, Dkt. 74-1. And even after the initial declaratory order proceedings,
7 Class Counsel continued to represent the interests of the consumers in additional flare-ups before
8 the WSGC, including in similar declaratory order proceedings initiated by The Stars Group. *See*
9 Logan Decl. ¶ 11.

10 *Second*, Class Counsel has been the frontline opposition to the social casino industry’s
11 attempt to change Washington’s gambling laws. Starting in early 2019, the International Social
12 Gaming Association (“ISGA”), a trade organization co-founded by Playtika, provided legislators
13 draft legislation that would amend Washington’s gambling statutes with the effect (and specific
14 intent) of gutting these lawsuits. *See* Logan Decl. ¶ 12. Over time, these efforts gained steam,
15 with Senators Mark Mullet and John Braun, as well as Representatives Zack Hudgins, Brandon
16 Vick, Bill Jenkin and Brian Blake, collectively sponsoring four (4) bills threatening to kill these
17 cases by “clarifying” that players who lose money playing social casinos cannot recover under
18 the Recover of Money Lost at Gambling Act (“RMLGA”). H.B. 2720, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess.
19 (Wash. 2020); S.B. 6568, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); H.B. 2041, 66th Leg., Reg Sess.
20 (Wash. 2019); S.B. 5886, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). Local and national media covered
21 these efforts and left no doubt as to what the ISGA hoped to accomplish. *See, e.g.*, Phillip
22 Conneller, *Washington State Social Gaming Legislation Could Rescue Big Fish Casino From*
23 *Legal Trouble*, CASINO.ORG (Jan. 29, 2020), <https://bit.ly/39dKtWM>.

24 In response, Class Counsel engaged the lobbying firm Peggen & Mara Political
25 Consulting LLP—experts in Washington tribal and gambling laws—to help Class Counsel (i)
26 stay on top of all administrative and legislative developments in the Washington gaming
27 industry; (ii) understand the intricacies of Washington’s specific legislative process, including

1 the nuances of—and procedures for—bill drafting; (iii) understand who the relevant lawmakers
2 and stakeholders in Washington’s gaming industry were, what those lawmakers and stakeholders
3 cared about, and how Class Counsel could educate those lawmakers and stakeholders about
4 social casinos; and (iv) work with legislative groups, task forces, and other interested parties in
5 in Washington’s gaming industry, including the Washington Indian Gaming Association
6 (“WIGA”). *See* Logan Decl. ¶ 13.

7 Class Counsel then used this information and expertise to amplify the Class’s interests
8 and concerns. Class Counsel drafted memos and prepared handouts for a variety of stakeholders,
9 including State Senators and Representatives, the WIGA, the Washington Trial Attorneys’
10 Association, the Public Interest Research Group, and other organizations dedicated to remedying
11 problem gambling. *See id.* ¶ 14.

12 Class Counsel also personally met with lawmakers in the Washington Senate and House,
13 met with officials in the Executive branch, and provided in-person testimony to the Washington
14 Legislature. *See id.* ¶ 15. For example, in January 2019—after Class Counsel got wind that the
15 ISGA was planning to gut Washington’s gambling statutes (in what would become the failed
16 H.B. 2041 and S.B. 5886)—Class Counsel met in-person with Representative Shelley Kloba,
17 then-Representative (and now Senator) Derek Stanford, Lieutenant Governor Cyrus Habib, and
18 several other government officials. *See id.* ¶ 16. On January 28, 2020, Class Counsel met with
19 Senator Stanford at the State Capital—following Class Counsel’s written and in-person
20 testimony before the House Civil Rights & Judiciary Committee in (successful) opposition to
21 H.B. 2720. *See id.* ¶ 17.

22 Class Counsel’s efforts went beyond in-person testimony and meetings with legislative
23 and executive officials. On March 21, 2019, Class Counsel sent formal correspondence to
24 Senator Mark Mullet ahead of a planned work session before the Senate and Financial
25 Institutions, Economic and Trade Committee about social casinos—in which Defendants’
26 industry peers had been invited, but Class Counsel had not. *See id.* ¶ 18. In August 2019, Class
27 Counsel traveled to Anacortes—on Swinomish Tribe land—to speak at a monthly WIGA

1 meeting, in opposition to the ISGA-backed bills. *See id.* ¶ 19. And in early 2020, Class Counsel
 2 coordinated the submission of more than 200 letters to Washington State Representatives from
 3 Big Fish Casino players across the country and spoke with local press about the ISGA’s renewed
 4 efforts to gut these lawsuits. *See id.* ¶ 20; *see also* Melissa Santos, ‘Free’ casino apps prey on
 5 addiction, users say, and WA lawmakers are considering a crackdown, CROSSCUT (Feb. 7,
 6 2020), <https://bit.ly/3hfFxDI>. These efforts held the line. Each bill introduced over the past two
 7 years has stalled.

8 *Third*, beyond Class Counsel’s work on legislative and administrative fronts, Class
 9 Counsel also helped its clients sound the alarm on social casinos to the public at large by helping
 10 clients share their stories with local and national media, including in the following pieces:

- 11 • *Harpooned by Facebook*, REVEAL-CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Aug.
 12 3, 2019), <https://bit.ly/39NIdri> (featuring radio interview with Class Counsel’s
 13 client)
- 14 • *How social casinos leverage Facebook user data to target vulnerable gamblers*,
 15 PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 13, 2019), <https://to.pbs.org/3lPRd1m> (featuring television
 16 interview with Class Counsel’s client)
- 17 • Melissa Santos, ‘Free’ casino apps prey on addiction, users say, and WA
 18 lawmakers are considering a crackdown, CROSSCUT (Feb. 7, 2020),
 19 <https://bit.ly/3hfFxDI> (featuring Class Counsel’s clients and Class Counsel
 20 Alexander Tievsky)
- 21 • *Addicted to losing: How casino-like apps have drained people of millions*, NBC
 22 NEWS (Sept. 14, 2020), <https://nbcnews.to/39Lo1X1>

23 **V. The Settlement Now Before The Court.**

24 Following all of these efforts, and with the assistance of Phillips ADR, Class Counsel
 25 reached a settlement with Defendants that provides a non-reversionary cash recovery of
 26 \$38 million from which every Class Member who has ever lost money playing Defendants’
 27 social casino games is entitled to recover a substantial portion of their losses back. *See* Dkt. 121-
 1 § 1.32. Class members with higher levels of losses are entitled to recover increasingly higher

1 percentages of their losses, and the upper echelons of “VIP” players stand to recover more than
 2 half of their losses. *See id.* §§ 1.36, 2.1(c). The settlement also requires Defendants to implement
 3 meaningful prospective relief, including by providing addiction-related resources within their
 4 social casino games and by creating and honoring a self-exclusion policy akin to what one might
 5 expect to soon see at the Emerald Queen or the Muckleshoot casinos. *See id.* § 2.2.

6 THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

7 For the Court’s convenience, the key terms of the Agreement are summarized below.

8 **A. Settlement Class Definition:** The Settlement Class is defined as follows: “all
 9 persons who played the Applications on or before preliminary approval of the settlement while
 10 located in the state of Washington.”² *See id.* § 1.33.

11 **B. Monetary Benefits:** Defendants have agreed to establish a \$38,000,000.00
 12 Settlement Fund from which Settlement Class Members who file a valid claim will be entitled to
 13 recover a cash payment, after deducting costs and administrative expenses, any fee award to
 14 Class Counsel, and any incentive payments to the Class Representatives. *See id.* § 1.32. No
 15 portion of the Settlement Fund will revert to Defendants. *Id.* § 2.1(i). Any Settlement Class
 16 Member checks not cashed within 90 days of issuance will be either be placed in a second
 17 distribution fund or donated to a Court-approved *cy pres* recipient. *Id.* § 2.1(h). As described in
 18 detail in the Plan of Allocation, the amount of each Settlement Class Member’s payment will
 19 vary based on the Settlement Class Member’s total losses (those with higher loss amounts are
 20 eligible to recover a greater percentage of their losses) and overall Settlement Class Member
 21 participation levels. *See id.* §§ 1.36, 2.1(c), Exhibit E. Based on its experience, Heffler Claims
 22 Group (the “Settlement Administrator”) anticipates that participating Settlement Class Members
 23 in the highest category of Lifetime Spending Amounts will recover the majority of their losses,
 24

25 ² Excluded from the Settlement Class are (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members
 26 of their families, (2) the Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parent companies, successors, predecessors, and any
 27 entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former officers,
 directors, and employees, (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class,
 and (4) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons. *See* Agreement § 1.33.

1 and that participating Class Members in the smallest category of Lifetime Spending Amounts
 2 will recover more than 10% of their losses. *See* Dkt. 122 ¶ 15. Settlement Class Members will be
 3 able to quickly and easily estimate the amount of their potential payment on the Settlement
 4 Website. *See* Agreement § 4.2(c).

5 **C. Prospective Relief:** Defendants have agreed to establish a voluntary self-
 6 exclusion policy that will allow players to exclude themselves from further gameplay. *See id.*
 7 § 2.2. Defendants must also make a link to that policy prominently available within the games,
 8 and their customer service representatives will provide the link to players who contact them and
 9 reference or seek help for video game behavior disorders. *See id.* Defendants have also agreed to
 10 other prospective relief measures, including changes to game mechanics such that when players
 11 run out of virtual chips, they won't need to purchase additional chips or wait to receive free
 12 additional chips to keep playing Defendants' games. *See id.*

13 **D. Release:** In exchange for the monetary relief described above, Defendants and
 14 other entities, including the Platform Providers Facebook, Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft,
 15 and Samsung, will be released from all claims raised in these cases relating to the operation of
 16 Defendants' social casino games and the sale of virtual chips in those games, including claims
 17 that the games were illegal gambling or the chips were "things of value." The full release is
 18 contained at *id.* § 1.27.

19 **E. Attorneys' Fees, Expenses Requests & Incentive Award Requests:**
 20 Contemporaneously with the filing of this motion, Class Counsel are filing a motion for
 21 attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards.

22 ARGUMENT

23 I. The Court Need Not Revisit Class Certification.

24 A threshold inquiry at final approval is whether the Class satisfies the requirements of
 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). *See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011,
 26 1019-1022 (9th Cir. 1998). Because no relevant facts have changed since the Court certified the
 27

1 Settlement Class, Dkt. 221, the Court need not revisit class certification here. *See, e.g., Aikens v.*
2 *Panatte, LLC*, No. 2:17-cv-01519, Dkt. 54 (W.D. Wash. Feb 5, 2019) (Lasnik, J.).

3 **II. Notice Was Successful And Satisfied Due Process.**

4 Prior to granting final approval to this Settlement, the Court must consider whether the
5 Class members received “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
6 individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ.
7 P. 23(c)(2)(B); *accord Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974). “The rule does
8 not insist on actual notice to all class members in all cases.” *Mullins v Direct Digital LLC*, 795
9 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015); *see also Juris v. Inamed Corp.*, 685 F.3d 1294, 1321 (11th Cir.
10 2012) (noting that “even in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, due process does not require that class
11 members actually receive notice” and collecting cases). Although what constitutes the “best
12 notice practicable” is case-specific, the Federal Judicial Center has noted that a notice campaign
13 that reaches 70% of a class is often reasonable. Federal Judicial Center, *Judges’ Class Action*
14 *Notice & Claims Process Checklist & Plain Language Guide*, at 3 (2010), available at
15 <https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/NotCheck.pdf>.

16 The Court already provisionally approved the Notice Plan proposed by the Class
17 Representatives and Class Counsel. Dkt. 124 at 5-6. That plan utilized both direct and
18 publication notice to the Settlement Class. *Id.* To provide direct notice to all who were eligible to
19 submit a claim for payment from the Settlement, Class Counsel worked with Counsel for
20 Defendants and also subpoenaed a variety of third parties to obtain contact information for
21 everyone with a Lifetime Spending Amount of greater than zero (*i.e.*, those who are entitled to
22 make a claim against the Settlement Fund). *See generally* Declaration of Brian Smitheman
23 (“Smitheman Decl.”). As the Court is well aware, this was not an easy process. Class Counsel
24 engaged in extensive negotiations with Platform Providers. Apple, Google, Facebook, and
25 Microsoft ultimately provided Class Counsel with sufficient data to effectuate the Notice Plan.
26 Class Counsel was forced to move to compel the necessary data from Amazon. *See Kater*, No.
27 15-cv-00612, Dkt. 224. Ultimately, after two orders from this Court (*see Kater*, No. 15-cv-

1 00612, Dkts. 250, 256)—and then even further negotiations—Amazon provided the necessary
2 information. *Cf.* Smitheman Decl. ¶ 5.

3 Once that data was collected, it was transmitted to Heffler Claims Group LLC, the
4 Settlement Administrator, to compile a complete Class List. The Defendants and Platform
5 Providers ultimately provided Heffler with contact information for approximately 280,000
6 accounts, and Heffler created a notice list of 294,142 emails. *See id.* ¶ 11. Heffler then sent out
7 two rounds of email notice. In the first round, which did not contain accounts associated with
8 Amazon because Amazon had not yet produced that data, 220,606 emails were successfully
9 delivered. *See id.* ¶ 12. In the subsequent round, which did include Amazon data, Heffler emailed
10 211,657 reminder notices to Class Members who had not yet filed a claim. *See id.* ¶ 15. Of the
11 reminder emails sent, 209,653 (or 99%) were successfully delivered. *See id.*

12 Additionally, using the information provided by Defendants and the Platforms, Heffler
13 sent postcard notice via U.S. First Class mail to 53,446 accounts identified as having Lifetime
14 Spending Amount of \$100 or more. *See id.* ¶ 10. Heffler further sent postcard notice to Class
15 Members whose email notice bounced. *See id.* As of December 10, 2020, Heffler received 21
16 Notices returned by USPS with a forwarding address, and then re-mailed those Postcard Notices
17 to the updated address. *See id.* ¶ 13. As of December 10, 2020, 421 Postcard Notices were
18 returned as undeliverable by the USPS without a forwarding address. *See id.* ¶ 14.

19 Direct notice was to be supplemented by online publication notice in the form of digital
20 advertisements targeted to be seen by individuals most likely to be part of the Settlement Class.
21 Given the extent to which social casino players are active on social media, Heffler purchased
22 sponsored ads on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter. *See id.* ¶ 6. These social media
23 ads, coupled with traditional internet banner advertisements, generated more than 23 million
24 impressions. *See id.* ¶ 8. In addition, keyword search targeting was used to show advertisements
25 to users in Google search results and their Gmail inboxes, and streaming radio ads were
26 purchased on Pandora. *See id.* ¶¶ 10, 14.

1 Overall, the Notice Program, including direct email and postcard notice as well as best in-
2 class tools and technology, reached at least 82% of Settlement Class Members in Washington.
3 *See* Declaration of Jeanne Finegan (“Finegan Decl.”) ¶ 3.

4 Finally, all forms of notice accurately described the Settlement and directed the recipient
5 to the Settlement Website, where Class Members can review the Plan of Allocation, use a slider
6 tool to estimate in real time how much of their losses they are projected to recover through the
7 Settlement, and file a claim. *See* Agreement § 4.2(c); Dkt. 120 at 6-7.

8 This all confirms what the Court already provisionally found: the Notice Plan here, which
9 reached at least 82% of Settlement Class Members in Washington, *see* Finegan Decl. ¶ 3,
10 constituted the “best practicable notice” under the circumstances, and was reasonably calculated
11 to apprise interested Settlement Class Members of their rights under the Settlement. As far as
12 Class Counsel is aware, there have been no issues noticing the Settlement Class, and most recent
13 figures confirm the estimates provided to the Court at preliminary approval. The Court should
14 therefore find that the Notice Plan ultimately complied with Due Process.

15 **III. The Court Should Finally Approve The Settlement.**

16 To approve the settlement of a class action as fair, reasonable, and adequate, Rule 23(e)
17 requires Court to consider “whether (A) the class representatives and class counsel have
18 adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief
19 provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and
20 appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including
21 the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of
22 attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified
23 under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.”
24 These factors largely encompass those identified by the Ninth Circuit for evaluating a class
25 settlement. *See In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011)
26 (quoting *Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004)).

1 The Committee Notes to the recent revision of Rule 23 make clear that the newly
2 enumerated factors were not intended to replace approval factors already used in courts around
3 the country, but “rather to focus the court and the lawyers on the core concerns of procedure and
4 substance that should guide the decision whether to approve the proposal.” Thus, courts examine
5 the new Rule 23 factors alongside the traditional *Churchill* factors relevant to the particular case,
6 mindful that there is considerable overlap between the two. *See, e.g., Walters v. Target Corp.*,
7 No. 3:16-cv-1678-L-MDD, 2020 WL 6277436, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2020).³

8 **A. Class Counsel and the Class Representatives have adequately represented**
9 **the Class and support the Settlement.**

10 Class Counsel’s representation of the Class’ interests here was not just adequate; it was
11 extraordinary. Class Counsel filed this case, in 2018, after obtaining a landmark Ninth Circuit
12 ruling in the related *Kater* matter. From the start, Class Counsel had to defend Washington’s
13 gambling laws from repeated attacks both in the WSGC and in the Washington State Legislature.
14 All the while, Class Counsel dealt with motion after motion after motion from both
15 Defendants—including a *forum non conveniens* motion, a 12(b)(6) motion, a personal
16 jurisdiction motion, and a motion to certify key issues to the Washington Supreme Court. *See*
17 Dkts. 48, 52, 57, 84. Time and time again, Class Counsel held the line and marched the case
18 closer to class certification and trial, ultimately leading to the Settlement now before the Court.
19 All of these efforts demonstrate that Class Counsel provided more than adequate service to the
20 Class in this case.

21 Class Representatives Wilson, Burdick, Taylor, and Thibert likewise adequately
22 represented the Class. Each communicated with Class Counsel, responded to requests for
23 information, closely reviewed the terms of the Settlement, discussed the Settlement with Class
24 Counsel, and signed the Settlement because they believe it is fair and in the best interests of the
25 Class. *See* Declaration of Sean Wilson (“Wilson Decl.”) ¶ 5; Declaration of Cathy Burdick

26 _____
27 ³ There is no governmental participant here, so that factor is neutral. Further, to date, there are no agreements
that must be identified under Rule 23(e)(3), nor do counsel anticipate reaching any such agreements.

1 (“Burdick Decl.”) ¶ 3; Declaration of David Taylor (“Taylor Decl.”) ¶ 3; and Declaration of
2 Jesse Thibert (“Thibert Decl.”) ¶ 3. Their services were more than adequate.

3 The Court may also consider Class Counsel’s support of the Settlement, which also
4 favors approval. *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 946. It is well-established that “[t]he
5 recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of reasonableness.” *In re*
6 *Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quotations omitted).
7 Class Counsel here are the only lawyers with experience prosecuting these types of claims, and it
8 is their considered judgment that this Settlement represents an outstanding result for the
9 Settlement Class.

10 **B. The Settlement was negotiated at arm’s length.**

11 There can be no serious question that the Settlement here was negotiated at arm’s length
12 and was the product of non-collusive negotiations—as the Court has already preliminarily found.
13 *See* Dkt. 124 at 4. That the Settlement was reached only after weeks of arms-length negotiation,
14 during which time the Parties exchanged substantive briefing on the core legal issues and were in
15 near-daily communication with an ADR team lead by Judge Phillips (ret.), supports a finding
16 that there was no collusion here. *See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir.
17 2009) (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, non-collusive, negotiated
18 resolution.”); *Helde v. Knight Transp., Inc.*, No. 2:12-cv-00904 RSL, Dkt. 191 at 2 (W.D. Wash.
19 May 24, 2017) (granting preliminary approval where “Settlement Agreement resulted from
20 extensive arm’s-length negotiations, with participation of an experienced mediator”); *Gragg v.*
21 *Orange CAB Co., Inc.*, No. 12-cv-0576 RSL, 2017 WL 785170, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1,
22 2017) (same). The Parties reached this Settlement only after years of intense litigation marked by
23 round after round of contested issues. Indeed, it is safe to say that Class Counsel and defense
24 counsel agreed on almost nothing of substance over the course of this litigation.

25 Moreover, this Settlement contains none of the red flags the Ninth Circuit has identified
26 as indicative of possible collusion: (1) “when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of
27 the settlement, or when the class receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply

1 rewarded,” (2) “when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement,” and (3) “when the
 2 parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be added to the class
 3 fund.” *In re Bluetooth* 654 F.3d at 947 (quotations omitted). Class Counsel’s fee will be
 4 determined separately, but as explained in Class Counsel’s fee petition, they seek a percentage
 5 recovery that is consistent with Washington law and Ninth Circuit precedent, reflects their work
 6 here, and is proportionate. Moreover, the Settlement does not contain a “clear sailing”
 7 agreement; Defendants are free to object to Class Counsel’s fee petition if they so desire. *See*
 8 Agreement § 8.1. And there is no reverter here. All Settlement funds will go to Class Members,
 9 less Class Counsel’s fees and any administrative costs. *See id.* § 1.35. This consideration clearly
 10 supports final approval.

11
 12 **C. The amount offered in Settlement is adequate, taking into account the
 13 strength of Plaintiff’s case, and the risks inherent in further litigation.**

14 Even before the revised Rule 23 highlighted that the Court should consider the amount
 15 offered in settlement, courts recognized that the size of any settlement, compared to the
 16 likelihood of full recovery, “is generally considered the most important” factor in evaluating a
 17 settlement. *See Bayat v. Bank of the West*, No. C-13-2376 EMC, 2015 WL 1744342, at *4 (N.D.
 18 Cal. Apr. 15, 2015). Here, an evaluation of the risks present in this litigation, combined with an
 19 assessment of the scope of relief, shows that the Settlement easily qualifies as fair, reasonable,
 20 and adequate.

21
 22 **i. The Settlement Class would have faced significant delay before it
 23 could have recovered anything on the merits.**

24 Ultimately, Class Counsel believes in the strength of these cases on the merits. The key
 25 legal questions, particularly under the RMLGA, are straightforward, and in Class Counsel’s view
 26 have been conclusively answered by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the appeal in the *Kater*
 27 matter. Nevertheless, the case presented some legal risks. For instance, Defendants here raised

1 the contention that the regular provision of free chips within their gambling games meant that the
2 chips themselves were not “things of value.” *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 99 (seeking to certify issue to the
3 Washington Supreme Court); *accord Benson v. DoubleDown Interactive*, No. 18-cv-525, Dkt.
4 103 (W.D. Wash. June 17, 2020) (same). Plaintiff, of course, disagrees, and this Court has
5 dismissed that contention at every turn, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Kater*. But it is
6 also true that the opinion in *Kater* specifically notes that the court did not consider the
7 defendants’ specific arguments about the regular provision of free chips. *See* 886 F.3d at 787.

8 Moreover, as Plaintiff explained at preliminary approval, the principal risk here was
9 legislative—*i.e.*, the chance that Defendants’ efforts at changing the law, either through the
10 Washington Legislature or the WSGC, would succeed before this matter reached judgment and
11 leave Settlement Class Members with nothing. Class Counsel have thus far fended off the
12 ISGA’s phalanx of well-heeled lobbyists, but Defendants and their ISGA comrades are
13 formidable opponents. If these cases do not settle now, each legislative cycle the class will be at
14 risk of having their claims eviscerated in the name of “remov[ing] . . . economic uncertainty” by
15 “clarifying” that proposed class members cannot recover under the RMLGA. H.B. 2720, 66th
16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020).

17 This legislative risk is particularly acute here because it is practically inevitable that this
18 case would take years to reach judgment. Merits discovery was only in its nascent stages, and—
19 based on the flurry of briefing on the pleadings alone—there is every reason to believe that the
20 Parties would have fought tooth and nail on every issue had the case not settled. Such discovery
21 fights would inevitably prolong the discovery period here, after which the Parties would heavily
22 contest class certification and, perhaps, summary judgment, and then trial. The history of the
23 case so far also suggests that any trial verdict was bound to be appealed, further lengthening the
24 proceedings.

25 Courts have regularly recognized that the prospect of significant delay while a case works
26 its way to judgment is reason to favor immediate settlement. After all, one dollar today is worth
27 significantly more than one dollar three years from now. *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 966 (“Inevitable

1 appeals would likely prolong the litigation, and any recovery by class members, for years. This
 2 factor, too, favors the settlement.”); *Ikuseghan v. Multicare Health Sys.*, No. 3:14-cv-05539
 3 BHS, 2016 WL 3976569, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2016) (“[T]he outcome of trial and any
 4 appeals are inherently uncertain and involve significant delay. The Settlement avoids these
 5 challenges.”). But delay is especially problematic here. The longer the case survives, the more
 6 opportunities Defendants and their allies would have to effect retroactive change to the law.

7 **ii. Given the risks involved with further litigation, the amount offered in**
 8 **Settlement is outstanding.**

9 The most significant aspect of the secured by this Settlement is the \$38 million non-
 10 reversionary common fund, which will be used to help Settlement Class Members recoup their
 11 losses. That is an “astounding” recovery. Rubenstein Decl. ¶ 2. It is a significant enough sum that
 12 Class Members with the largest Lifetime Spending Amounts stand to recover more than 50% of
 13 their losses, and that no participating class member is likely to recover less than 10% of their
 14 losses. *See* Dkt. 122 ¶¶ 13-16. By way of example, Class Members whose losses are
 15 approximately \$10,000, \$30,000, and \$100,000, respectively, are projected to recover \$1,500-
 16 \$2,500 (\$10,000), \$7,500-\$13,500 (\$30,000), and \$50,000+ (\$100,000). It is difficult to compare
 17 this recovery to the recovery provided for under other comparable settlements, given that this
 18 case has no true peers to be reasonably measured against. On the facts, the closest comparator is
 19 almost certainly *In re Apple In-App Purchase Litigation*, in which the class alleged that certain
 20 apps offered within Apple’s App Store were “highly addictive, designed deliberately so, and tend
 21 to compel children playing them to purchase large quantities” of in-game currency, “amounting
 22 to as much as \$100 *per purchase* or more.” 2013 WL 1856713, at *1 (emphasis added). But
 23 there, the settlement established no common fund at all, the default recovery for participating
 24 class members was five dollars (yes, \$5), and with adequate proof some claiming class members
 25 could claim refunds for a single 45-day period of purchases. *Id.* at *5. Similarly, in *Kim v.*
 26 *Tinder, Inc.*, the class alleged unfair pricing with regard to in-app purchases in a popular dating
 27 app. No. CV 18-3093-JFW(ASX), 2019 WL 2576367, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2019). The

1 settlement established no common fund at all, and participating class members received 50 free
2 “Super Likes” (*i.e.*, coupons) in addition to an option to select a \$25 cash payment (as an
3 alternative to other coupon offers). *Id.* Without meaning to punch down, there is just no
4 comparison between the settlements that have ever previously been reached in factually-similar
5 cases to the settlement currently before the Court.

6 Perhaps the better measuring stick for this settlement are class action settlements in the
7 consumer privacy space, given that those settlements often resolve large (statutory) damages
8 claims and are premised on novel interpretations of law as applied to allegations of internet-
9 based misconduct. Consumer privacy settlements, too, are notorious for failing to provide
10 consumers with real-world relief for the damages they have suffered. For example, *In re Google*
11 *Referrer Header Privacy Litigation*, 869 F.3d at 740, approved the settlement where all of the
12 money was to go to *cy pres*, with no cash relief for the class at all. *Gaos*, 139 S. Ct. at 1045. And
13 even in consumer privacy settlements that do provide monetary relief and have been adjudged to
14 be fair and reasonable by district courts, the relief is often primarily in-kind. *See, e.g., In re*
15 *Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.*, 327 F.R.D. 299, 324 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (explaining that less than
16 10% of the “fund” was available for cash payments, with the rest being reserved to purchase
17 credit monitoring services); *In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, No. 16-MD-
18 02752-LHK, 2020 WL 4212811, at *22 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2020) (cash relief made available
19 only to class members with existing credit monitoring, out-of-pocket losses, and who paid
20 Yahoo! for premium services).

21 And beyond the cash recovery, the Settlement provides for substantial non-monetary
22 benefits. The Settlement requires Playtika to implement meaningful prospective relief, including
23 by providing addiction-related resources within its social casino games and by creating and
24 honoring a meaningful self-exclusion policy. *See* Agreement § 2.2. Given the fervor with which
25 Defendants have long insisted that their games are not gambling, these in-game changes are a
26 monumental achievement for the Settlement Class. They represent the first steps toward much-
27 needed self-regulation within the social casino industry, and given Playtika’s prominence in the

1 social casino industry, other industry players have and will continue to follow suit.

2 These measures also highlight that resolving this case now is itself a benefit. Recall that
3 Plaintiff alleges that many members of the Settlement Class are problem gamblers, whose
4 addictions cause real-world problems like devastating credit card bills. Had the case not settled,
5 Settlement Class Members would have continued to suffer these and other similar harms,
6 perhaps with devastating and irreversible consequences in some cases. Bringing this litigation to
7 a beneficial conclusion now will forestall these harms from occurring, a potentially incalculable
8 benefit to some Settlement Class Members.

9 In sum, the amount offered in the Settlement, when compared with the risks and expense
10 of further litigation, strongly supports final approval.

11 **D. The Settlement treats Settlement Class Members equitably.**

12 The revised Rule 23 further asks courts to assess whether the proposed settlement “treats
13 class members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). The Rule’s revised
14 text makes clear that *equal* treatment is not required, but fair treatment is instead the goal. The
15 Settlement here achieves that goal.

16 As the Court explained at preliminary approval, and as hashed out in detail in the Plan of
17 Allocation, a Settlement Class Member’s total recovery will depend on the extent of their losses
18 (*i.e.*, those with greater losses will recover a higher proportion of their losses). *See* Dkt. 124 at 3.
19 The Plan of Allocation therefore distributes Settlement funds according to those who have
20 suffered the greatest harm.

21 Allocating settlement funds in this way achieves an equitable result. Settlement Class
22 Members with tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in losses have frequently suffered serious
23 collateral harms, such as alienation from family or friends, or the accrual of huge debts, that were
24 not suffered by those who may have purchased \$10 or \$20 worth of chips. And even though all
25 Settlement Class Members have equally strong RMLGA claims, Settlement Class Members with
26 huge losses who accessed Defendants’ VIP tiers and interacted with a VIP host may have a
27 stronger CPA claim to release here. As explained above, in Class Counsel’s view, the Class

1 stands largely on equal footing. But a clear-eyed assessment of the risks that lay ahead
2 demonstrates that certain claims are stronger than others, something appropriately reflected in
3 the Plan of Allocation. *See In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Securities Litig.*, 603 F.2d 1353,
4 1365 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that the district court’s approval of certain offsets “in [a] Plan
5 of Allocation was a component of its duty to insure the equitable distribution of the settlement
6 proceeds”); 2 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 6.23 (17th ed. 2020) (“Allocation formulas,
7 including certain discounts for certain types of claims within a class, may properly take into
8 consideration the comparative strengths and values of different categories of the settled and
9 released claims.”).

10 Likewise, the provision of service awards for the Named Plaintiff and other class
11 representatives are consistent with the equitable treatment of class members. Sean Wilson seeks
12 an award of \$5,000. This modest award reflects his service to the Class. Mr. Wilson put his name
13 to a lawsuit that advanced a novel theory and that ultimately allowed injured individuals to
14 recoup thousands of dollars in losses. While that is typical of class plaintiffs, the risk of
15 reputational injury here is higher, given the subject matter of the lawsuit. Mr. Wilson also
16 reviewed pleadings and participated in the settlement process. As explained in the separate
17 motion for incentive awards, an award of this size is in line with other awards given to class
18 representatives, and fairly reflects his service to the Settlement Class. Given that his efforts were
19 key to ensuring that the Settlement Class recovered anything, the modest proposed incentive
20 award for Wilson is fully consistent with equity.

21 David Taylor, Cathy Burdick, and Jesse Thibert each seek an award of \$1,000. This
22 modest award, too, is equitable, given their respective contributions to the Settlement Class.
23 Each reviewed the terms of the settlement and ultimately stepped forward to share their approval
24 of the settlement with the public—helping demonstrate the settlement’s success. The proposed
25 \$1,000 incentive award for these services is also fully consistent with equity.

26 In sum, the Settlement treats all Class Members equitably relative to each other,
27 supporting final approval.

1 **E. Class Counsel had completed sufficient discovery to reach an informed**
 2 **judgment about the benefits of settling, and the quality of the Settlement.**

3 Next, the Parties “had enough information to make an informed decision about the
 4 strength of their cases and the wisdom of settlement.” *Rinky Dink Inc. v. World Bus. Lenders,*
 5 *LLC*, No. C14-0268-JCC, 2016 WL 4052588, at *5(W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2016). The Parties only
 6 agreed to mediate after more than two years of contentious of litigation, and consequently
 7 negotiated with a crystal-clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Parties’
 8 claims and defenses. *See* Dkt. 121 ¶ 9. This included substantial jurisdictional discovery efforts,
 9 including Caesars’s production of thousands of pages of documents. *Id.* ¶ 3.

10 Moreover, in the weeks before the mediation, Defendants provided Plaintiff with several
 11 sets of detailed transactional data for virtual chip purchases; the Parties exchanged substantive
 12 briefing on the core facts, legal issues, litigation risks, and potential settlement structures; and the
 13 Parties supplemented that briefing with extensive written and telephonic correspondence,
 14 mediated and shuttled by the Phillips ADR team, clarifying each other’s positions in advance of
 15 the mediation. *See id.* ¶ 8. On June 10, 2020, the Parties were able to reach agreement on an
 16 appropriate settlement amount, and negotiations continued over the following days until a final
 17 term sheet was executed. *See id.* ¶¶ 9-10. By then, the Parties were fully informed on all
 18 pertinent issues and capable of assessing the benefits of the settlement now before the Court. *See*
 19 *id.* ¶ 9; *Ikuseghan*, 2016 WL 3976569, at *3 (approving settlement reached “between
 20 experienced attorneys who are familiar . . . with the legal and factual issues of this case in
 21 particular”). This factor, too, thus supports final approval.

22 **F. The reaction of the Settlement Class has been favorable.**

23 Finally, current claim data indicates that the Class has responded favorably to the
 24 Settlement, warranting final approval. Thus far, the Settlement Administrator has received more
 25 than 6,700 claims. Smitheman Decl. ¶ 18. Somewhat astoundingly, for a settlement of this size,
 26 and given the breadth of publication notice about the Settlement, nobody has opted-out and
 27 nobody has filed an objection. *Id.* ¶¶ 16-17. The absence of any opposition to the Settlement

1 speaks volumes regarding the fairness and adequacy of the Settlement. “When few class
 2 members object, a court may appropriately infer that a class action settlement is fair, adequate,
 3 and reasonable.” *Schneider v. Wilcox Farms, Inc.*, No. 07-CV-01160-JLR, 2009 WL 10726662,
 4 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2009). Courts in this district have found that class reaction supported
 5 final approval even with significantly higher exclusion and objections rates. *See Pelletz v.*
 6 *Weyerhouser Corp.*, 255 F.R.D. 537, 543-44 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (lauding “positive response” of
 7 Settlement Class of 110,000 to 140,000 members where 19 excluded themselves from the
 8 settlement, and 3 objected); *Clemans v. New Werner Co.*, No. 3:12-cv-5186, 2013 WL
 9 12108739, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2013) (in settlement involving class of 300, one
 10 objection and four exclusions were filed, court found that “the overwhelming non-opposition to
 11 and participation in the Settlement [are] strong indications of Class Members’ support for the
 12 Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable.”); *see also Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 967 (concluding
 13 that the district court “had discretion to find a favorable reaction” when 54 of 376,301 class
 14 members objected to settlement); *Churchill Vill.*, 361 F.3d at 577 (affirming approval of class
 15 action settlement where 45 of 90,000 class members objected). Given the high participation rates
 16 here, and total absence of any opposition to the Settlement, the Court should find that the
 17 reaction of the Settlement Class favors final approval.⁴

18 CONCLUSION

19 The Court should finally certify the Settlement Class and grant final approval to the
 20 instant Settlement.

21
 22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: December 14, 2020

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27 ⁴ Consistent with the Court’s order at Dkt. 124, Class Counsel intend to file a supplemental brief with final claims numbers and projected recoveries after the claims deadline and prior to the final fairness hearing.

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25
26
27

The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE**

SEAN WILSON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PLAYTIKA LTD, an Israeli limited company,
and CAESARS INTERACTIVE
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,

Defendants.

No. 18-cv-5277-RSL

**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Noting Date: January 15, 2021

1 THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class
2 Action Settlement. The Court has considered all papers and materials submitted by the parties in
3 support of the proposed Settlement Agreement, including Plaintiff's motions for preliminary and
4 final approval of the Settlement Agreement and the declarations of Class Representatives, Class
5 Counsel, and the Settlement Administrator. The Court held a Final Approval Hearing on
6 February 7, 2021, at which the Court heard argument from counsel and allowed others to appear
7 to voice their support for, or objection to, the Settlement. Based on all these materials and the
8 statements at the Final Approval Hearing, the Court issues the following Order and Final
9 Judgment:

10 **1. Settlement Terms.** All terms and definitions used herein have the same meanings
11 as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

12 **2. Jurisdiction.** The Court has jurisdiction over the Parties, the subject matter of the
13 dispute, and all Settlement Class Members.

14 **3. Class Certification.** The Court confirms its certification for settlement purposes
15 of the following Settlement Class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

16 All persons who played Slotomania, House of Fun, Caesars Casino/Caesars Slots, and
17 Vegas Downtown Slots & Words on or before Preliminary Approval of the Settlement
while located in the State of Washington.¹

18 *See* Agreement, Dkt. 121-1 § 1.33. The Court also finds that this action meets all prerequisites of
19 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including numerosity, commonality, typicality,
20 predominance, and superiority; that the Class Representatives are adequate representatives of the
21 Settlement Class; and that Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Settlement Class.

22 **4. Class Notice.** The Settlement Administrator completed delivery of Class Notice
23 according to the terms of the Agreement, as preliminarily approved by the Court. The Class
24

25 ¹ Excluded from the Settlement Class are (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and
26 members of their families, (2) the Defendants, Defendants' subsidiaries, parent companies, successors,
27 predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their
current or former officers, directors, and employees, (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely
request for exclusion from the class, and (4) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such
excluded persons.

1 Notice given by the Settlement Administrator to the Class was the best practicable notice under
2 the circumstances and was reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise Settlement
3 Class Members of the pendency of the Action, their right to object to the Settlement or exclude
4 themselves from the Settlement Class, and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing. The Class
5 Notice and the means of disseminating the same, as prescribed by the Agreement, was
6 appropriate and reasonable and constituted due, adequate and sufficient notice to all persons
7 entitled to notice. The Class Notice and the means of disseminating the same satisfied all
8 applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutional due process, and
9 any other applicable law.

10 **5. Settlement Approval.** The Court hereby grants final approval to the Settlement
11 and finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best
12 interests of the Settlement Class. The Court finds that the Settlement is within the authority of
13 the Parties and the result of extensive, arm's-length negotiations. The Parties are directed to
14 proceed with the Settlement procedures specified under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,
15 including payment and prospective relief.

16 **6. Objections or Exclusions from Settlement Class.** Class Members were given a
17 fair and reasonable opportunity to object to the settlement. No members of the Class have timely
18 and validly requested to be excluded from the Class and the Settlement. No objections have been
19 brought to the Court's attention. This Order is thus binding on all Class Members and has res
20 judicata and preclusive effect in all pending and future lawsuits or other proceedings maintained
21 by or on behalf of Class Members with respect to the Released Claims.

22 **7. No Admission.** Neither this Final Judgment nor the fact or substance of the
23 Settlement Agreement shall be considered a concession or admission by or against Defendants or
24 any other related party, nor shall they be used against Defendants or any other released party as
25 an admission, waiver, or indication with respect to any claim, defense, or assertion or denial of
26 wrongdoing or legal liability.

1 **8. Dismissal with Prejudice.** Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, the action
2 (including all individual claims and class claims) is hereby dismissed with prejudice on the
3 merits, without costs or attorney’s fees to any Party except as provided under the terms of the
4 Settlement Agreement, this Final Judgment, and the Court’s Order Granting Class Counsel’s
5 Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Expenses and Issuance of Incentive Awards.

6 **9. Releases.** This Order incorporates the Releases set forth in the Settlement
7 Agreement and makes them effective as of the Effective Date. All Settlement Class Members
8 who have not properly sought exclusion from the Settlement Class are hereby permanently
9 barred and enjoined from filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in, or participating (as
10 class members or otherwise) in any lawsuit or other action in any jurisdiction based on the
11 Released Claims, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

12 **10. Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses.** Pursuant to the Court’s Order Granting Class
13 Counsel’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and Issuance of Incentive
14 Awards, the Court awards \$9,500,000 million in attorneys’ fees and \$56,835.50 in costs and
15 expenses to Class Counsel.

16 **11. Incentive Awards.** Pursuant to the Court’s Order Granting Class Counsel’s
17 Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and Issuance of Incentive Awards, the Court
18 awards \$5,000 to Sean Wilson for his services as a Class Representative and awards \$1,000 each
19 to David Taylor, Cathy Burdick, and Jesse Thibert for their services as Class Representatives.

20 **12. Continuing Jurisdiction.** Without affecting the finality of the Final Judgment for
21 purposes of appeal, the Court retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties and
22 all matters relating to the Settlement Agreement, including the administration, interpretation,
23 construction, effectuation, enforcement, and consummation of the Settlement and this Order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _____ day of _____, 2021.

ROBERT S. LASNIK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE